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A soteriology of reading:
Cavell's excerpts from memory
WilliamDay
I can see that my clinical issues may have enabled a couple of critical insights
here. But what does it take for the critical to inspire the clinical?
Sta;iley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy
The dificulty in understanding Stanley Cavell's relation to literary criticism is
felt, typically if not rnost acutely, not so much by those trained in philosophy
as by those trained in literary criticism. This undoubtedly is a by-product of
the fact that most philosophers trained in the tradition in lv;hich Cavell himself
was trained are, by and large, happy to ignore his writings in and about criti-
cism. Still, it is not surprising that those trained in literary criticism can find
his critical writings perplexing. There is, after all, an intimate overlapping and
criss-crossingbetween Cavell's writing aboutJ. L. Austin and LudwigWittgen-
stein and scepticism and acknowledgement, on the one hand, and his subse-
quent (and often, his immediately succeeding) writing about Shakespeare and
film and opera, on the other hand. Absent serious and sustained engagement
with that philosophical writing and the philosophical texts that provoke it, you
rvill find that sizeable regions of Cavell's thought are simply opaque to you.
One might imagine that the best advice to give such readers of Cavells
writings in and about criticism is, simply: read more philosophy. But beyond
its unhelpfulness (because it says the obvious), that advice runs the danger
of encouraging the sarne error that it wants to locate in others, of separating
Cavell tire philosopher from Cavell the literary (and 61m and opera) critic and
theorist. Beginning with his {irst essays, however, Cavell himself has describe<i
the work of literary criticism ar.rd of philosophy in ways that show them to be
profoundly revealing of one another. More recently, Caveli has been drarvn to
the parallel between the demands of philosophy as he conceives it * illustrated
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in the method, ofth. 1.t., Wittgenstein and of ordinary language philosophy 
-
and the demands of autobiography. If the former parallel (between philosoplry
and literary criticism) shows itself in operation to be part of a sketch of a theory
of criticism 
- 
what Caveil has chosen to call 'a theology of reading' (TOS 53)
- 
so, toof his recent efforts at philosophy-as-autobiography are concerned with
the point of reading no less than with the practice of writing, and they express
cavells interest in a soteriological or redemptive understanding ofreading.
ln what follows I will want to bring out the intimacy between Cavell,s
practice of philosophy and his remarks on literary criticism by considering
fwo pairs of sentences from cavell! essay 'T.he politics of Interpretationl first
published (under the title 'Philosophy as Opposed to What?') in 1982. I will
then work my way from some pertinent descriptions in cavellk semi-autobio-
graphical'Philosophy and the Arrogation ofvoice' (the first chapter of Apitclr
of Philosophy from 1994) to rhe fragment of cavell's autobiography pubrished
in 2006 as 'Excerpts from Memory' (republished, though not without some
minor textual variations, as the opening chapter of Little Did I Knor.u). My aim
in reading these three texts together is to make explicit an argument I find in
them for the redemptive structure of the work of reading, an argument that
moves through these texts from theory to practice, culminating in the latter
text's climactic retold memory that cavell labels his 'revelation of paternal
hatred' {EM779; IDK 16).
Philosophy and criticism
The intimacy befween Cavell's practice of phllosophy and his remarks on
literary criticism is found almost everywhere in the pages of his first collection
of essays, MastWeMeanWhatWeSay?, where the thought ofWittgenstein and
Kierkegaard is revealed through the same attention to the impact or impression
oftheir words that caveil brings to his readings ofBeckett and shakespeare.
An illuminating statement of this cornection is given a dozen years iater in
cavell's essay'The Politics of Interpretationl while there is much in this essay
that bears on the topic of the present volume, I want to concentrate on two
pairs of sentences from this essay as prelude to what I will say about'Excerpts
from Memoryl
The first pair of sentences appears sornewhat buried in a footnote which
they conclude: 'The underlying subject of what I take criticism to be is the
subject of examples. I suppose it is the underlying subject ofwhat I take philos-
ophy as such to be' (TOS 47 n.l}). As I read it, Cavellt claim is not merely
that criticism deais with or trades in examples, that it takes specific works (of
literature, painting, music, etc.) for its subject, but that its sublect is examples.
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That is, criticism practised rightly is inevitably concerned with the status ofthe
examples it employs to alter our way of seeing or hearing, with what they have
to teach us about such things, and especially with how anything ever should
come to serue as an example, an example oJ this rather than of something else.
What determines such a status? To appreciate how this question can be meant
quite generally, consider the following brief series of wonders from Cavell's
The Claim of Reason: 'What is the difference between regarding an object now
as an individual, now as an example? One way of putting the problem about
examples (and hence one problem of universals) is: How is the question'bf
whatisthis object (saywhat we call a shoe) an example?" to be answered? One
wants to answer it by holding up the shoe and crying out, "Why, an example of
this!" Would it help to hold up a different shoe? If you did, and someone then
replies, "Nor.u I see what it (the first shoe) is an example ofi'what would he have
seen? (This seems to be what Berkeleyt idea of a particular idea (or object)
representing others of "the same sort" amounts to)' (CR 186).I
The context of Cavellt remark 
- 
it is, roughly put, an aesthetic context 
-
suggests to me that the following distinction might direct the question about
examples to fertile ground. The underlying interest in examples in literary criti-
cism and in philosophy is not, curiously, an interest in what an example shares
with whatever it is an example of; whereas that does seem to be our interest
in examples when we are, say, choosing a carpet or a sofa fabric, or when we
do natural science. That is, while in these activities we do speak of examples
(or rather, of samples and of controlled experiments) as being of interest to us
because of how they are like what they exemplify (an example as an instance
or token), we also speak in aesthetic contexts of something being the 'right' or
'telling' or'perfect' example, one which interests us because of its emblematic
aptness or richness (example as exemplar).2 While I do not say that this is an
absolutely clean distinction, it seems right to say that when we are interested in
something as instance or token we mostly are not interested in it as exemplar,
and vice versa. Our interest in one eclipses our interest in the other, like two
aspects of the same figure. What this means is that these two senses of 'example'
are distinguished not by the classes ofobjects they pertain to but by the interest
we happen to take in something. I can point to one and the same instance of
'clutch hitting' in baseball, for example, with an interest in teaching the use of
the term to someone new to the game, but also in the course of explaining why
pst this hit at this late moment in fhis championship game produces such an
explosion of admiration and disbelief and praise 
- 
why, thanks to that effect on
:us, it epitomizes clutch hitting. We can take an example that seems to sit at the
crossroads of literature and philosophy: the early dialogues of Plato, in their
proposing to find the definitions ofpiety or virtue or beauty, often can be read,
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and perhaps are best read, as moving from some pitifully poor example or set
ofexamples ofthe quality in question 
- 
offered by Socrates' interlocutor at the
beginning of the dialogue 
- 
to what one might call the exemplary exemplifi-
cation of that quality, and of its absence, in what Socrates and his interlocu-
tors, respectively, inevitably show of themselves 
- 
that is, in the action of the
dialogue. (Here the pertinence of the question about examples to autobiog-
raphy, the topic ofthe second section below, should begin to show itself.)
To understand that philosophy could be concerned at bottom with
examples is, in the mouth of Cavell, to understand the stunning accuracy, and
the discerning ear, employed in the procedures ofJ. L. Austin and of ordinary
language philosophy. While one can be impressed by the glorious mundane-
nessofAustin'sprofferedexamplestoillustrate'whatwesaywhen (forinstance:
when we knock things over at the dinner table; when we step on a snail; when
we tie a string across a stairhead; when we feed the penguins peanuts3), their
mundaneness does not imply that they function as mere instance or token for
Austin, as they might, say, for Plato. (Here I have in mind those moments in
the Platonic dialogues where Socrates introduces the activities of the farmer or
physician or carpenter or athletic trainer in order to advance, or disguise, his
line of questioning.) Something else, something dificult to see, is being asked
of us when Austin reminds us that 'we may join the army or make a gift volun-
tarily, we may hiccough or make a small gesture involuntarily', but we cannot,
ordinarily, join the army involuntarily or hiccough voluntarily.a What we are
to do with any such example of our speaking life, proffered in the practice of
ordinary language philosophy, is not to treat it as an instance ofa kind, that is,
to generalize it (as if all such examples point to the same moral: 'language is
llke thk') 
, but to do something mo rellke perJorm the example, or try it on. We
are asked to imaginatively hear the words surrounded by our originary interest
in them, by the form of life in which they are at home. In 'The Politics of Inter-
pretation', Cavell characterizes ordinary language philosophy as 'the recovery
of fthe human] voice' (TOS 48). It is as if he were claiming that our coming to
speak (again) depended on our knowing how to take the right interest in things
- 
that is, roughly, on our knowing how to read examples as exemplary.s (This
thought will be key to my reading of 'Excerpts from Memory' in the second
and third sections below.)
I turn next to a second pair of sentences from 'The Politics of Interpreta-
tion', sentences from the stretch of argument culminating in Cavellt claim to
be producing'a theology ofreading': 'It is not first ofall the text that is subject
to interpretation but we in the gaze or hearing of the text ... Access to the
text is provided not by the mechanism ofprojection but by that oftransfer-
ence' (TOS 52). The aim ofour reading, ifwe recognize ourselves as the textt
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victim, or patient, is to be guided by the text, past the risks of its seductiory to
our freedom from the person of the author. As Cavell explains when he returns
to this thought some years later, 'that idea implies that the fantasy of a textt
analyzirg its reader is as much the guide of a certain ambition of reading 
- 
of
philosophy as reading 
- 
as that ofthe reader s analyzing the text' (Cf t t:). fo
read a text in the former way 
- 
under the fantasy of the text analyzing me 
- 
is
to find ways in which it shows me how to find myself beyond it, which is to say
beyond myself as its reader.
While this emblem of reading as psychoanalytic transference is among
Cavell! most memorable claims or discoveries, it is not his immediate counter.
proposal to the views of Stanley Fish and Paul de Man, the particular exponents
of the theory of reading as deconstruction whom Cavell addresses in 'The
Politics of Interpretationl6 Prior to his arriving at this emblem borrowed from
a central concept of Freudt teaching, Cavell detours through a specification
of what he wants to claim is 'the underwriting of Austin and Wittgenstein by
Emerson and Thoreau' (TOS 48) that culminates in his presenting a counter-
emblem of reading (not as transference but) as salvation or redemption. Here
are two observations made along the way of this detour. First, in discussing
Emerson while drawing out his difference from de Man, Cavell writes: 'There
is always humanly a reason to postpone salvation. But it is part of Emersonk
gesture to claim that his genius is redemptive beyond himself. The implication
is that if you are not willing to make such claims for your work, do not call it
philosophy' (TOS 50). And in the following paragraph, in discussing Thoreau,
he says: At the moment I focus on Thoreaut way of saying that reading his book
is redemptive. I take it for granted that the scene [described by this sentence
fromWalden: "You only need sit still long enough in some attractive spot in
the woods that all its inhabitants may exhibit themselves to you by turns"] is
oneofinterpretation,ofreadingandbeingread... Sothewritertsilence(that
is, this writert writing) declares itself redemptive religiously, aesthetically, and
politically' (ToS 5l).'
If Cavell s most telling term of criticism of the theory of reading as decon.
struction is that it distracts us from what truly requires justification in our
philosophical discourse, and that thereby deconstruction shows by its distrac.
tion that 'there is always humanly a reason to postpone salvation', why does
this language of redemption give way to the related, but differently entangled,
language of psychoanalysis? Listen to how Cavell explains it: 'For most of us,
I believe, the idea of redemption or redemptive reading and interpretation
will not be credible apart from a plausible model or picture of how a text can
be therapeutic, that is, apart from an idea ofthe redemptive as psychological,
... [and] I imagine that the credible psychological model of redemption will
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have to be psychoanalytic in character' (fOS St-Z). It seems to me that
cavell's shift from the language of redemption to that of psychoanalysis is not
completely willed here, as if something makes cavell reluctant to give Freud
pride of place.s Or perhaps I should say that the shift is made almost apolo-
getically, as if guided by the thought that, however easy it is to misconstrue
this employment of Freud's language in characterizing the aim of reading, it
is less easily misconstrued than employing the language of redemption 
- 
the
language of, say, Paul (and I don t mean Paul de Man).e
Indeed, the reason for the ease of misconstruing the claim 'reading is to be
understood psychoanalytically'is that most'psychoanalytic'readings of texts
(including some of Freudt own readings 
- 
for example, of Hoffmant ,The
Sandman') take the text as the primary object of interpretation rather than
the reader.l. That this is not how the later wittgenstein sees our relation to his
difEcult writing 
- 
that he describes his methods as offering (not solutions to
problems but) treatments, 'like different therapies'rl 
- 
is one of the principal
points of contact between him and the American Transcendentalists Emerson
and Thoreau. (Perhaps the best advice one can give in interpreting philosoph-
ical Inuestigations is to bear in mind that wittgenstein, as cavell says, tonceives
ofphilosophy as a kind ofreading' (TOS 52).)
To summarize this first section, I have emphasized and slightly amended the
following two claims from'The Politics of Interpretation', (t) the underlying
subject of both criticism and philosophy is examples conceived as exemplars;
(2) reading is to be understood redemptively, which one can construe to mean
'therapeutically' or 'psychoanalytically] as the reader's being read by the text.
The philosophical text so conceived is meant to free us not only from our
unexamined or dogmatic beliefs (a familiar task under the traditional concep-
tion of philosophy) but also from our unthinking ways of taking in what we
read. Similarly, literary criticism so conceived should free us not only from
the error of simply projecting ourselves onto the text (a bad theory of inter-
pretation from most any theoretical standpoint) but also from the calamity
of sacrificing our thinking to the text, to what cavell calls its seductions. It is
in characterizing this latter danger that cavell alludes to Emersont 'Divinity
School Address', noting that the point of that address is'to free us from our
attachment to the person of the one who brings the message [call thisJesus],
an attachment . . . of idolatryl My aim here has been to reveal or flesh out how
cavellt signature claim from'The Politics oflnterpretation 
- 
the claim that
reading has the structure oftransference 
- 
is framed, on one side, by a picture
of reading as redemption and, on the other, by Cavellt summary assertion that
'what I arn producing here . . . might be thought of as a theology of reading'
( TOS 53 ).
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Philosophy and autobio graphy
Ifthe goal ofreading is freedom from the person ofthe author, how do we
overcome the author whose story we pick up precisely because it is her or his
story? That is, how can we be read by someone elset autobiography _ in the
instance we are about to take up, the autobiographical 'Exc..pt, fro- trr"-o.y'
by stanley cavell? Does it help to observe thai autobiography is a genre that
from the beginning has been preoccupied with the qo.rtio,' of thi author,s
exemplarity 
- 
thinking ofAugustine and, differentry, of Rousseau 
- 
and so with
the reader's relation to what is there to be emulated or imitated? It may help,
but not enough: for even if Augustinet conJessions dramatizes the reader's
potential for conversion through an act ofreading 
- 
even ifits knowredge of
every prevarication and postponement I can employ or have employea 
"guirrrtsalvation somehow opens me to (what Augustine would call) Godt gr;ce _I may still be at a loss when faced with an autobiography by a 
-or"-"orl.r,
secularJew of four score who claims the mantle of philosophy. And even if the
methods of ordinary language philosophy are, as *e ha.,re s"en, concerned with
exemplarity and sg as Cavell says, demand a systematic engagement with the
autobiographi cal' (Pe 6), we may stil wonder what gaining our freedom from
this-ordinary language philosopher engaged with autobiography (this way)
might look like (this time).
In order to address these questions, we must first add a further piece to the
picture of cavell's picture of reading, gleaned from the first chapter-ofhis semi-
autobiographical text A pitch of phitosophy. one,third of the way through that
chapter,-where its recognizably autobiographical part begins, cavel delcribes
in brief but vivid detail his parents'contrasting rnfluenJe on his image of or
expectations for reading. Here I will consider explicitly only his mothei's influ_
ence. The image of reading that he inherits from his mother pertains to .her
uncanny ability to sight-read' music 
- 
not her facility at it but her attitude
while in the midst of it, an attitude cavell comes to identify with the onset of
migraine and with 'some kind of melancholy] but which he describes before
that as precisely not ... a knack of interpretation, but somethinq like the
contrary, a capacity to put aside any interference, as of her o*r, *ill, 
"rrd 
tolet the body be moved, unmechanically, by the mind of those racing notes'(PP_18). What I imagine Cavell to be noticing in rhinking of readinion the
model of sight-reading music, letting'the bodyle moved, ,rn-".h"rri"lly, by
themind of those racing notes,, is that the sight_readert ongoing recept**.r,
to the passing notes is dependent on her ability t o imagine the sounds of those
notes' without some such performative imagination, the body rs fated to move
mechanically.
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'Imagine the sound' is the imperative characterizing virtually every instance
of interpretation in cavellt oeuvre, whether it concerns a work for the theatre,
a film or a philosophical text. We reed consider here only some obvious
instances. In distinguishing wittgenstein's methods from those of American
pragmatism with which they might appear to overlap, cavell observes that 'we
must keep in mind how different their arguments sound, and admit that in
philosophy it is the sound which makes all the difference' (MWM 36 n. 3t).
The flurry of questions that open the first section of cavellt essay onEndgame
concludes, 'What gives to fthese characters'] conversation its sound, at once
of madness and of plainness>.' (MWM 1r7). cavellt masterfur reading of King
Lear rests on his critical attention to the voice uttering the words hnd through
that to the phenomenology of the straits of mind'that at each moment inform
the characters' progress (UW\UZel). Similarly, the weight Cavell gives to the
words spoken in the films that he identifies as comedies of remarriage depends
on his conviction that 'the words of dialogue put on the page ... have to be
taken from the page and put back, in memory, onto the screen .. . Apart form a
clear recall, or a vivid imagination, of these words as spoken by these actors in
these environments, my attention to the words may well seem, indeed ought
to seem, misplaced or overdone' (PH ll). perhaps it is not surprising in the
case of dialogue from the theatre or film, just as in Austinian examples, that
imaginatively hearing the words in their originating environrnent is described
as something like hearing or being receptive to the sounds of the notes. But to
see the extent to which cavell relies on the act ofimaginative hearing, compare
this remark on reading Thoreaut writingr again from A pitch of philosophy:
'Writing appe ars inWalden not as an extension but as an experience of speech;
. .. it is not different in means or in medium [from speech] . . . for reading with
understanding requires reborn sensations, and first in hearing' (ru +t). nut
where and how can access to onet imaginative powers, to an equivalent of the
enigmatic faculty of perfect pitch' (lf Zt), be construed as an imperative for
reading?
That such powers of imagination are called for by Cavellt 'Excerpts from
Memory', and that satisfying these demands is required for reading this work
as redemptive in Emersont and fhoreaut sense as discussed above, is evident
in two early passages, both from the first entry of2July 2003. ('Excerpts from
Memory'unfolds as a series of dated entries, like a diary of remembrances.) In
the first, cavell explains his eschewing a chronological presentation or narra-
tive for this attempt at autobiography because, as he says, 'such a narrative
strikes me as leading fairly directly to death, without clearly enough implying
the singularity of this life, in distinction from the singularity of all others,
all headed in that direction.' Then comes the accurate and familiar term of
\
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criticism: 'So the sound of such a narrative would I believe amount to too little
help, to me or others' (ntvf zz o; LDK 4,my italics). The second passage occurs
even earlier and is, strictly speaking, Cavellt first act of memory in'Excerpts
from Memory', a text Cavell begins to write as he awaits an invasive medical
procedure, the catheterization of his heart. Remembering 'a previous such
period of awaiting surgery',r2 Cavell tells us: 'I discovered fthen] that reading a
bookbyVladimirJank6l6vitch on the music of Debussy ... effectively concen-
trated my attention, partly because of the beauty of the musical illustrations
along with the very effort it required for my rusty musicianship to imagine the
sounds of the illustrations unfamiliar to me that Jank6l6vitch includes in his
text' (EM 768; LDK 2, my iralics).
Here it helps to know that musical illustrations (typically, excerpts from a
score), in contradistinction to (fu11) musical scores, do not necessarily require
of readers 'the effort to imagine the soundsl Depending on how they are used,
they might require only that readers spot the similar motion in the notes, or
read the quality of a chord, or check that a variant line is the retrograde of
another, and so on. Musical illustrations, like any textual illustration, can be
used for different purposes. For Cavell to tell us that the illustrations inJank6-
l6vitcht text demand a greater responsibility, a greater imaginative respon-
siveness, is thus an important distinguishing feature of this text. The mention
of the detail of imagining the sounds of Debussy's music from the score (a
singularly difficult task in the case of Debussy as compared wittr, say, a score
by Bach or Mozart or Beethoven) 
- 
together with the fact, dropped between
the lines, that Cavell purchasedJank6l6vitch's text in preparation for writing his
autobiography (or more specifically, for writing the third chapter of his semi
autobiographical text A Pitch of Philosophy) 
- 
thus prepares Cavellt reader for
the kind of reading that will open up the text called'Excerpts from Memoryl
The necessity of freeing onet powers of imagination is underscored
immediately before that essayt climactic story, to which we are about to turn.
Cavell relates and joins two events from his undergraduate days at Berkeley:
his fathert request, and his inability to meet the request, to write an acceptance
speech for him (his father's written English was worse than his accented spoken
English); and Cavell's signing up for an acting class that followed Stanislavski's
An Actor Prepares in order to, as he puts it, explore this virtue of imaginationl
As he considers the unusualness of this as preparation for a life in philosophy
he notes that 'my philosophy teachers would not have accepted Stanislavsikan
exercises as bearing on the issues of what we were calling the problem of the
existence of other minds. But then those teachers did not need me to write
speeches for them' (nm ZZ t ; LDK 14). So Cavellt failure to find words for his
father leads him to study Stanislavski on imagining how another feels. If the
A soteriology of reading
demands of the text before us on our imaginative powers are not yet clear, then
we are not imagining hard enough.
Cavellt autobiographical entry for 7 J:uiry 2003 begins, 'I believe I can date
the moment at which I realized that my father hated me or, perhaps I can more
accurately say, wished I did not elst' (EM 778; LDK 14-15). The scene of
revelation is the following. Cavell (who is about to turn seven), his mother
and his father have on this day moved from the house in Atlanta where he has
lived with not only his parents but his grandmother and two beloved uncles (a
house he calls for this reason'paradise') to an apartment on the north side of
Atlanta where the occupants will be just his parents and him. We are given his
state of mind: 'Walking up the stairs to the top floor of the boxlike three-story
brick apartment building . . . the catastrophe of the move broke over me in
waves that I have periodically felt have never entirely stopped breaking' (EM
780; LDK l7). He enters the darkened front room, his mother in the room off
to the right with some women friends, and notices, in particular and in this
order, two things. The first is 'a purple glass bowl ... covered with a dome top of
matching silver inset with purple glass panels.' He finds that the bowl contains
tmall chocolate mint wafers whose tops were covered with tiny white dots
of hard candy, a treat I loved to sample when these used to fill this container
in anticipation of company coming to the old housel The second object of
Cavell's notice is his father, ttanding silently in the semidark at the other end
of the sofa', with whom, Cavell tells us, he was rarely in a room alone.
Then in the last of several postponements in his relating the moment of his
'revelation of paternal hatred', Cavell reminds us one more time of the impor-
tance of sound and imagination in sight-reading (so to speak) the notes of this
text, by relating in these words the game he would play as his parents drove into
the driveway late at night after he had gone to bed words that could stand for
the task of his reader: 'I imagined them getting out of the car, my mother from
the left since my father did not drive, then walking up the driveway and across
the front porch into the house, measuring my accuracy oJ imagination by how
closely the distant sound oJ the opening of thefront door coincided with my imagina-
tion of their hauing reached it' (EM 7 8l ; LDI( I 8, my italics). Back in the new
apartment with the glass bowl of wafers and Stanleyt father, the story reaches
its climax with these sentences: As I took one of the speckled wafers from the
purple bowl, I said aimlessly, but somehow to break the silence with my father,
"I didn't know we had these here'l He lurched at me, wrenched the dome top
and the wafer out of my hands, and said in a violent, growling whisper, "And
you still don't know itl"' (EM 781-2i LDK l8).
The shock of this telling is surely in the fathert lurch, in the words meant
to hurt long before they can be appreciated for their irony in denying what is
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evident to the senses, and not least in their being whispered, as iftheir violence
is to be kept hidden from the women in the next room. Whether that is enough
to call on my imagination of the scene 
- 
not only to picture it in my mind, say,
but to take on its philosophical significance, and not to jump at the similarity,
however shallow or deep, between the fathert denial of the childt knowledge
and the grown-up Cavell s unending interest in the problem of scepticism 
- 
I
find that the shiny purple glass bowl with the speclded wafers has caught my
attention.
The name for these speckled wafers, as for the speckles or sprinkles them-
selves, is, of course, 'nonpareils', and they are still a popular confection. Am I to
believe that the Stanley Cavell writing in 2003 is unfamiliar with these wafers'
proper name? Without deciding that I cannot believe this, even as I notice that
Cavell makes a point of telling us that he looks up the term'Mason jar' at a
later uncertainty over kitchen vocabulary (EM 805; the observation is omitted
from the text in Liffle Did I l{now),1 am content to note that the word he has
settled on is not honpareil' or 'disc' but 'wafer113 The purple glass bowl with
the dome top, meanwhile, is described as 'somewhat wider but less deep than a
drinking tumblerl Such a home for wafers in the Anglican and Roman Catholic
churches, at least, is called a ciborium (or, if smaller, a pyx). The silver dome
'of matching silver inset with purple glass panels' might call to mind as well a
church of the Eastern Orthodox faith, the sort of structure one finds in Cavellt
fathert native Poland.
But what would be Cavells point in describing the scene with his father
so as to allow this imaginative revisioning? The scene is, before all, a scene of
deprivation that carries with it at some level for the reader the threat of castra-
tion. What is to be gained by recasting it as the childt offer 
- 
as theJewish child
Stanleyt offer 
- 
of the Eucharist, what we also call communion? But then, what
is to be gained by telling the story at all? It clearly costs Cavell dearly, even
while its secret has cost him considerably more. Yet he has come to feel that 'its
silence [is] blocking something irreplaceablyvaluable' (nUZZl; LOff 6). Bur
for whom? If the telling enacts some long-awaited catharsis, how are we invited
to feel it, and how does our doing so invite philosophy?
Redemptive reading
I{ following Emerson and Thoreau, the autobiographical spirit informing
Cavell's'Excerpts from Memory'is redemptive, then what is redeemed in the
telling ofthis scene ofpaternal hatred is, before all else, the episode itself. The
episode began as an offer inJact of communion of sorts, in itself a small thing,
from a son to his father with the crippled voice.ta (Cavellt words 'I didn t know
, 
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we had these here' are spoken 'aimlessly, but somehow to break the silence with
my father' (ZUZey fDI( 18).) That the boywas punished for this offer by the
fathert refusal of it is why, of course, it has singed the outer skin of his memory,
altering his sensation of what else not. We may find ourselves wondering not
so much what has made Stanley Cavell the philosophical spirit he is, but what
saved this boy and allowed him to become Stanley Cavell.
But there is more to the episode than its merely autobiographical (that is,
its Cavell-specific) interest. By offering his gesture and words as the ritual of
the Eucharist, Cavell has cast them in the place of the most representative of
representative acts (the giving of the bodys self in words, or the projection
of the self's body into language)' an excerpt from memory as exemplar. But
that is to say, there is philosophical work for the reader to do here. Here are
some work sites: howis it possible to redeem what I experience as an irredeem-
able act? How do sons grow up to understand their fathers sympathetically
rather than self-justifiably? What must a father give up to accept a sont offer
of comfort? And how could that sacrifice seem impossible to make? If these
questions are asked with their full weight, not only might we come to see how
this child prepares himself for the understanding of questions that populate
Cavellt essays and books, but we might find ourselves guided to a renewed
consideration of the representativeness of our own experiences.
Here is where an exemplary moment in our reading offers a path to freedom
from the author through the possibility of redeeming the moment.
The risk we run of being taken in by what we read, diverted from our orbit
by the gravitational pull ofthe text, is present in spades in the autobiographical
text. What might it take to notice that the attractions of the genre reside not
only in the authort reflections on events and acquaintances in his life but in
the remarkably mundane details of that life, including, and perhaps especially,
his life before he became an author, became who he is? Even in its most illus-
trious, because most self-deprecatingr instances 
- 
the Confessions ofAugustine
and the Confessions of Rousseau 
- 
we are, as it were, set up to be struck by
the distinctive banality of the protagonist's actions and transgressions. [n the
present instance, a time and a place that I could not have fancied as containing
more than the merest possibility of romance 
- 
the Eastern EuropeanJewish
quarter of 1930s Atlanta, Georgia, USA 
- 
is revealed in Cavell's narrative to
be a time and a place where the most life-altering memories were born. And
that this discovery is no illusion, not merely the result of a literary conceit, is
confirmed, of course, by the quality of the self-reflective or world-important
thoughts in Cavellt autobiography, in his philosophical writings and so on 
-
by whatever prompts one to take up his story, whatever one imagines Stanley
Cavell to have become.
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Some such dynamic is what leads to the impression (which I simply assert
on its behalf) that autobiography craves idolatry. And the author who wants
to prevent such conquests knows 
- 
if he has any experience at all of being
drawn by a text 
- 
that he cannot simply tell the reader to go her own way now,
any more than a therapist can acknowledge a patient's transference for her.
As Cavell writes in the foreword to his first book, 'the great teacher invariably
claims not to want followers, that is, imitators. His problem is that he is never
more seductive than at those moments of rejection (MWMxxxix).
It is in this light that I imagine we are asked to see Cavellt gesture of the
proffered wafer. Incorporating that simple and familiar emblem of redemp-
tion, the gesture helps to dissolve the threat ofidolatryby returning us to our
individual work sites 
- 
that is, if we take Cavellt advice and make the effort
(with'reborn sensations, and first in hearing') to'imagine the sounds'of these
words in their full resonance at the time of our reading them. For when we do,
we have the opportunity to notice that the drama of the moment is not just
that between the child Stanley and his father. There is, evidently or manifestly,
also the drama between the adult Stanley, writing these words, and his blocked,
singed memory of that first drama, the pain of which explains the text's enact-
ment of his delays and postponements in telling it. (To miss this piece of the
drama is to miss nothing less than what it takes to transform such memories into
words; not a small thing.) Similarly, just as there is the gesture of communion
(anyway, an offer of conversation) made from the child Stanley to his father,
so there is the adult Stanleyt gesture of writing that figure of communion into
his text, the consequences ofwhich it is up to the reader to accept or refuse,
a gesture to receive or deny. If the gesture is read as an emblem of redemp-
tion, then to receive the gesture is not quite to find oneself, or one's reading,
redeemed. (The author is neither our father nor a Father, neither the Son nor
his representative.) To receive this author's offer of an emblem of redemption
is, in the therapeutic reversal of one's reading, to be moved to redeem it.ts You
may do this, for example, by finding yourself returned to excerpts of memories
of your father, the one who in a sense cannot be known to you but who, in
a critical sense, is known to you alone, the father ofyour vivid and dull and
joyful and searing memories, particular memories waiting for their particular
redemption in critical self-reflection 
- 
which is to say, philosophically 
- 
that
you alone can give to them.
Ifthat suggestion is an example (ofwhich sort?) ofan answer to the question,
'What, in your reading of Cavell, is to be redeemed?', then it also points the
way to answering the questiory 'And what if I don t redeem it?' If a theory of
reading were to tell me what musthappen in my engagement with a text, then I
cannot imagine what I would do with it. And if a theory of reading knew what
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I am to discover that the text before me knows about me, it still could not tell
me. Redemption (of any sort) does not come so easily. It used to be that to
redeem was to pay a ransom to get someone out of captivity.t6 Nowadays we
might just swipe a card or read offsome numbers over the phone. (And so for
us redemption is merely a metaphor 
- 
if not something less, or worse.) Who is
not familiar with such practices, and such theories, of reading?
Cavellt 'Excerpts from Memory', with its figure for the Christian figure
of a literal offering of the selft body, exemplifies its authort understanding
of the aim of reading 
- 
what I have called Cavell's soteriology of reading 
- 
as
resting on the difficult, but not for that reason unpleasant, work of imaging
a thing's proper sound. Where might this work lead? Perhaps, wherever else,
to an answer to the perennial and critical question: is there salvation through
works?t7
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